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Abstract: This paper takes the establishment and demise of Manchester’s 
Creative Industries Development Service as an exemplary case study for the 
ways in which creative industry policy has intersected with urban economic 
policy over the last decade. It argues that the creative industries required specific 
kinds of economic development agencies which would be able to act as 
‘intermediary’ between the distinct languages of policy makers and ‘creatives’. 
The paper discusses the tensions inherent in such an approach and how CIDS 
attempted to manage them. It suggests that which particular circumstances 
might have intervened the main reason for the demise of the CIDS was the 
domination of the ‘economic’ over the ‘cultural logic’ both of which are 
embedded within the creative industries policy discourse.  
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Introduction  
 
In the last 20 years the image of Manchester has gone from that of a declining 
industrial to a re-invented ‘post-industrial’ city. Central to this new image have been 
both the subsidised arts – with major investment in infrastructure and events—and 
more commercial popular culture, most notably popular music (Haslam, 1999). This 
narrative in which arts and popular culture become emblematic of a transformative 
‘spirit of place’ is now well established within ‘celebratory’ texts on the city 
(Manchester City Council, 2002; 2004; King, 2006) and more critical and academic 
literature (Peck and Emmerick, 1992; O’Connor and Wynne, 1996; Taylor et al, 1996; 
Wynne and O’Connor, 1998; O’Connor, 1998; Brown et al, 2000; Ward, 2000; 2003; 
Peck and Ward, 2002; Haslam, 2005; Hetherington, 2007). Since 1998, when the 
UK’s Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) launched a new definition 
and set of policy directions (DCMS 1998), this culture-led regeneration narrative has 
also used the term ‘creative industries’ alongside ‘arts and culture’. 
 
Manchester has the largest creative industry sector in England outside of London, and 
its creative industries sector continues to grow as those of other cities stutter (NWDA, 
2008). Indeed, the BBC recently chose the city as the site for a large scale relocation 
of production facilities from London to a new 'Mediacity' in Salford Quays 
(www.mediacityuk.co.uk). This paper looks at an earlier initiative, the Creative 
Industries Development Service (CIDS), a small not-for–profit agency set up in 2000 
by Manchester City Council in partnership with a range of other local public agencies. 
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Its goal was to promote the economic development of the creative industries by 
helping frame, and provide a coordinated response to, the needs and aspirations of the 
sector. Our account of CIDS highlights some of the tensions within local creative 
industry development policy in the last 20 years. Central to these tensions was a 
persistent ambiguity between ‘culture’ and ‘economics’ that still marks the wider 
academic debate (Hesmondhalgh, 2007; O’Connor, 2007; Banks and O’Connor, 
2009).  
 
We suggest that the ‘creative industries’, though often defined in the placeless 
language of the ‘knowledge economy’, ‘creativity’ and ‘innovation’, are rooted in and 
held to exemplify complex local histories and cultures. We also suggest that the shift 
to ‘creative industries’ has positioned the ‘economic’ as the master signifier in these 
local policy discourses, in a way that frequently misunderstands the actual practices of 
the creative industries and cuts across their cultural identification with, and 
investment in, the city. We start by looking at the trajectory of cultural and creative 
industries policy discourse in a local economic context, and in particular the close 
connection to discourses of ‘culture-led urban regeneration’. We then discuss this 
connection to place in terms of creative industries and policy in Manchester, before 
looking in more detail at CIDS. We focus in particular on CIDS attempts to encourage 
local creative networks, and how this brought out some of the wider tensions between 
culture and economics to which we refer. We end with some concluding remarks on 
local creative industries policy. 
 
Cultural Industries and Culture-led Regeneration 
 
Though the creative industries are often presented in terms of ubiquitous creativity 
and global communications (Howkins, 2001; Hartley, 2005), they are very much 
rooted in particular places. These complex local roots have been clearly identified by 
economic geographers working on clusters, embeddedness and ‘cultural products 
industries’ (e.g. Scott, 2000; 2004) but this has been less recognized in terms of local 
policy-making. ‘Policy transfer’ has been central to the proliferation of cultural 
consultancy firms since the 1980s, where the possibility to adapt successful ideas 
from elsewhere is the key to the innovative capacity of ‘creative cities’ (Landry, 
2000). But creative industries policy discourses, even when ostensibly derived from a 
single source such as the DCMS strategy document, are very much local-path 
dependent (Kong et al, 2006). Andy Pratt (2009) has usefully discussed the limits of 
policy transfer and the specificity of particular policy regimes at national-regional 
level, but this has rarely been applied to particular cities or regions1. If the ‘creative 
class’ is supposedly highly mobile, looking to move to those cities that offer the best 
lifestyle infrastructure (Florida, 2005), this is much less so with policy makers, whose 
‘political capital’ is very much linked particular places2. This is certainly so in the UK, 
where ‘creative industries’ policy discourses arrived at least a decade after those of 
‘culture-led regeneration’ and ‘cultural industries’. 
 
                                                 
1 An interesting attempt was that of Taylor et al, (1996), bringing Williams’ national level ‘structure of 
feeling’ down to local city-region level – in this case contrasting Sheffield and Manchester. 
2 This is obviously linked to different political systems and their structuring of local and national – for 
example, unlike the UK, local power bases in France can launch national careers.  
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The increased centrality of ‘arts and culture’ to the ‘regeneration’ of older industrial 
cities from the late 1970s onwards is well established. For critics it represents a 
‘cultural fix’ for global capital (Harvey, 1989), organizing city centres around a 
process of gentrification and (cultural) consumption-based ‘landscaping’ (Zukin, 1982; 
1991; 1995), resulting in a fantasy city (Hannigan, 1998) or phantasmagorical 
cityscape. For others it had a more complex provenance in European urban cultural 
policy (Wynne, 1992; Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; O’Connor, 1998). Concern for 
‘quality of place’ expressed through cultural facilities and activities has certainly been 
a central concern of many – especially industrial – cities as part of an attempt to 
promote a new image to attract investment, mobile professionals and tourists, as well 
as retaining existing residents. Though frequently dismissed as local ‘boosterism’ 
many of these attempts were part of a much wider process of economic and socio-
cultural change, which relatively more permeable ‘urban growth coalitions’ (see 
below) attempted to set within a shared narrative of a dynamic ‘spirit of place’ 
capable of facing a new round of global competitive challenges. These urban 
narratives were not completely imposed by city marketing agencies but could tap into 
widespread (though often vaguely formulated) aspirations for the city on behalf of 
local citizens. These narratives, although primarily economic in traditional 
‘boosterism’, also had a strong cultural component – cultural not just in the sense of 
local identity but also in the more restricted sense of arts and popular culture. Though 
the popularity of ‘arts impact’ studies may have declined since the 1980s 
(Myerscough, 1988) there is little doubt that, even after a decade of ‘creative 
industries’ it is ‘arts and culture’ events and venues which remain the keystone of 
local authority ‘regeneration’ narratives – even in a city where ‘creative industries’ 
have grown significantly, such as Manchester. That is, despite their close alignment 
with narratives of economic transformation and ‘regeneration’, they still carry a 
strong ‘cultural’ charge. These local, cultural aspirational narratives, we shall argue, 
are particularly attractive for the ‘creative industries’.  
 
The increasing importance of ‘cultural industries’ to UK local authorities in the 1980s 
needs to be situated within wider processes of socio-cultural and political change, 
rather than dismissed as a ‘cultural fix’ at the service of ‘capital’, or indeed, of a local 
state incapable of influencing anything else (Peck and Ward, 2002). Neither can their 
growing prominence within local cultural strategies, giving rise to a range of new 
consultancy firms (especially Commedia), be understood simply as a response to 
decreased funding for the arts (Hewison, 1997): it relates to more complex notions of 
cultural democracy and local economic development which go back to the Greater 
London Council (GLC) of 1981-86 (Bianchini, 1987; Garnham, 1983/1990). The 
GLC vision, mostly embryonic, tried to deal with the fact that the vast majority of 
cultural consumption was delivered by the market not by the subsidized sector; any 
democratic policy must confront this. It also drew on European urban policy 
developments, especially from Italy (Bianchini, 1987), but also, as we shall see, new 
kinds of local economic strategy. It was both an economic and a cultural strategy, 
where countering the domination of (often large, multinational) distribution over 
(often local and small scale) production meant having to rethink the ‘arts welfare’ 
model of grants to individual artists. They moved to adopt an ‘industry model’ 
approach – ‘industry’ here referring to a designated economic sector not mass 
production (O’Connor, 2000) – with a concern for supply chains and complex 
combinations of creative and non-creative skills and businesses.  
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It is significant, however, that the first adoption of the notion outside of London was 
as an area-based regeneration strategy in Sheffield – the Cultural Industries Quarter 
(CIQ).3 Though explicitly geared to creating the future jobs of a post steel industry 
city, it was embedded in local strategy not through a citywide programme but as a 
vehicle for regenerating a decaying city centre site. To some extent it formed a part 
with developments in the Albert Dock, Liverpool (itself modeled on the Boston 
Waterfront development), Museum of Science and Industry in Castlefield, Manchester 
and related heritage and niche retail projects. The area-based focus of CIQ had 
pragmatic policy reasons. There was little knowledge of how to promote the cultural 
industries at local level, and such knowledge – or aspiration – as existed was closely 
linked with particular individuals who applied their energies to the limited policy base 
over which they had some control4. But there were wider political reasons, in that 
both local authority power and the wider rationale for local economic strategies were 
severely curtailed by the Thatcher Government, elected in 1979. 
 
Creative industries policies have been linked to ‘information society’ discourses 
originating with Bell and Tofler in the 1970s (Granham, 2005; Pratt, 2009; Pratt and 
Jeffcut, 2009). This certainly contributed to a discourse in which cities, liberated from 
the physical constraints of a manufacturing economy, seemed able to re-invent 
themselves through ‘creativity’. But there were other policy narratives drawn from 
European social democracy that were very much at play, from the GLC initiative up 
to and beyond New Labour’s redefinition. Indeed, much of early New Labour’s 
economic thinking, was concerned with a ‘third way’ between state control and free 
market, and they looked to the successful European regions such as the ‘Third Italy’ 
and Baden-Wurttemberg. The emphasis here was on locally embedded networks of 
small and medium sized enterprises (SME) operating very differently from the 
vertical and hierarchical integration of (mostly national) mass manufacturing and the 
globally mobile multinationals with little commitment to place. These ideas seemed to 
provide an alternative to Thatcherism amongst the social-democratic left in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Hall and Jacques, 1989; Zeitlin and Hirst, 1989; 
Hutton, 1995; Redhead, 2004). However, the space in which such alternative local 
economic strategies could develop was limited by Thatcher’s breaking up of the large 
metropolitan authorities (reducing Manchester City, for example, from a population of 
2.5 to just over half a million); and a series of legislative measures designed to restrict 
their powers of taxation, spending and intervention/ regulation. ‘De-industrialisation’ 
was used to drive through a programme of economic, social and cultural 
reconstruction in a way unique in Europe. As a result, UK local authorities remain 
bereft of the industry intelligence and range of policy tools and powers deployed by 
their counterparts in other areas of Western Europe.  
 
From the perspective of cultural/ creative industries policies, what mainly survived 
were the notions of ‘cluster’ and ‘creative milieu’. The notion of ‘industry cluster’ 
emerged into the mainstream of UK local economic policy making in the late 1990s. 
This notion, frequently attributed to Porter (1998; 2000) and much debated (cf. Martin 
and Sunley, 2003), has a complex provenance in the work of social and economic 
geographers concerned to identify those unique, often intangible, qualities of place 
                                                 
3 See Oakley (2009) for a retrospective discussion 
4 The emergence of new cultural policies, cultural industries policies, and creative city policies in 
places such as Sheffield, Birmingham, Greater Manchester, Bristol and Huddersfield relate very much 
to specific individuals – and often dissipated with their departure. 
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which gave rise to competitive advantage (Granovetter, 1985; Piore and Sabel, 1984; 
Powell, 1990; Markusen, 1996). Marshall’s (1898) notion of ‘atmosphere’, referred to 
by Porter, has been interpreted as the particular social and cultural dimensions within 
which local economic activity is embedded. If, in the UK, ‘cluster’ merely came to 
refer to a local industry sector or sub-sector – ‘digital cluster’, ‘music cluster’, ‘bio-
tech cluster’ etc. – on the other it directed attention to the locational dimension of 
these industries and the ‘untraded interdependencies’ which helped them thrive 
(Storper, 1995). Economic geographers working in this field sought further to 
distinguish creative industry clusters from other business clusters, and emphasised the 
socio-cultural dimensions of place as key factors of ‘competitive advantage’. In so 
doing they have used terms such as innovative or creative milieu, creative field, or 
creative, critical or soft infrastructure (Hall, 2000; Pratt, 2000; 2002; 2004; Scott, 
2000; 2001; 2004; 2006).  
 
There were thus clear linkages between the notion of cultural/creative industry cluster 
and the more established models of cultural or creative quarters, districts, precincts etc. 
These latter had also developed within the culture-led urban regeneration agenda of 
the 1980s, and involved a range of different models unified around the concentration 
of some form of cultural production or consumption (Bell and Jayne, 2004; Mommaas, 
2004; 2009; Roodhouse, 2006; Montgomery, 2007). They stressed the benefits of co-
location for both production and consumption; the mix of public and private actors; 
diverse leisure, retail and entertainment offers; and a wider concern with their 
contribution to, and benefit from, the image of the city within which they were located. 
Though the cultural/ creative industry cluster might focus more directly on the 
commercial businesses within it, they clearly benefited from the ‘buzz’ of 
consumption activities, and were similarly implicated in the wider ‘brand’ of the city. 
Indeed, cultural and later creative industry strategies continue to be focused on 
building based developments; whilst arts and museums get iconic modernist buildings, 
creative industries are still linked with industrial-era heritage. These latter 
developments are also promoted as iconic for the city’s contemporary creative brand5.  
 
Creative Industries as SME Policy: The Problem of Representation 
 
UK cultural and creative industries policies remained very much linked to urban 
regeneration initiatives at least until the more recent government initiatives around the 
(re) launch of the creative industries in the DCMS’ Creative Economy Programme in 
2005.6 Outside of regeneration policy the main source for development policies was 
support programmes for SMEs. Local economic development based on encouraging 
SMEs was derived both from the re-invented social economy ideas of the ‘Third Italy’ 
and European social-democracy noted above, and the more ‘Neo-liberal’ or ‘New 
Right’ ideas aimed at freeing entrepreneurship from bureaucratic obstacles. Thatcher’s 
government in the UK was firmly committed to these as part of the ‘enterprise culture’ 
and provided a whole range of legal and tax incentives for small businesses, along 
with an increase in training and business support. Many local governments seized on 
this agenda even if they had more leftish notions of local economic development. It 
was this general policy approach, especially the Enterprise Allowance Scheme, which 
                                                 
5 The list is extensive: Birmingham’s Custard factory, Helsinki’s Cable factory; Marseilles’ Cigarette 
Factory; Factory 798 in Beijing; Amsterdam’s Westergasfabriek and Witte Dame, Eindhoven; 
London’s Truman Brewery and Berlin’s Bruerei; Moscow’s Winery and so on. 
6 http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/creative_industries/3275.aspx 
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provided a launch pad for many small-scale cultural activities in the late 80s and early 
90s (McRobbie 1998; O’Connor and Wynne, 1996).  
 
Indeed, research reports from the time of the GLC on had indicated high levels of 
SMEs in the cultural industries sector, and their concentration in metropolitan regions 
(Pratt, 1997). As such cultural and later creative industry strategies almost always had 
a strong focus on support for SMEs. But these reports also showed that standard forms 
of support – business advice and training, access to loans and start-up grants, tax 
incentives etc. – did not work for the cultural industries. Creative businesses were 
seen to have different ambitions, priorities and ways of operating than ‘mainstream’ 
businesses (O’Connor and Wynne, 1996; O’Connor 1998; O’Connor, 2000; Banks et 
al, 2000; Raffo et al, 2000). Generally speaking, traditional business support agencies 
saw these cultural SMEs as ‘risky’ businesses; and the cultural businesses themselves 
saw these mainstream agencies as having no real understanding of what they did. 
Cultural businesses operate in a speculative, risky and volatile environment, one not 
managed using formal market analysis or risk assessment but often by informal, 
‘intuitive’, aesthetic and ethical procedures. To many in mainstream business support 
these sector specific practices were failures due lack of business training and could be 
remedied by generic ‘start-up’ programmes. To some extent the specific problems 
faced by these businesses were compounded by very basic generic errors – not 
understanding tax regulations or simple accounting, intellectual property and contract 
law issues, employment regulations and so on. But even these problems had specific 
inflections in the cultural industries and the solutions provided by mainstream support 
were often rejected by cultural businesses. The fundamental divide between cultural 
businesses and other businesses was often (though simplistically) encapsulated by the 
notion of ‘T-shirt and Suits’ (Parrish 2005).  
 
Despite this, from the mid-90s there was a growing demand for some form of business 
advice and support among local cultural industries. A number of small specialized 
agencies started by giving different levels of business advice and training to sole 
traders and small cultural businesses. These were often sub-contracted out by 
mainstream training and economic development agencies. Some local universities and 
colleges also began to provide bespoke training for prospective cultural entrepreneurs. 
Parallel to these, the Regional Arts Boards (the main channel of state subsidy to arts 
and cultural activities) also began to run business oriented seminars and short training 
courses. After 1998 the DCMS also called for skills training and business support 
initiatives from its national ‘art form’ agencies, and encouraged Schools and Further/ 
Higher Education Institutions to participate in creative industry focused training and 
skills programmes. These were usually focused around promoting ‘creativity’ and 
entrepreneurship (Redhead, 2004; Bilton 2006; Schlesinger, 2007; Banks and 
Hesmondhalgh, 2009). However, at local level business development and training for 
the creative sector developed on a much more ad hoc basis; this partly reflects the 
‘motley’ nature of creative industries voices and the question of policy leadership in 
an emergent field. 
 
What kind of body was to ‘own’ the creative industry agenda and how to identify 
those who could be interpolated as subjects/ agents for policy discourse? Large and 
more established industries (such as architecture, printing, broadcasting, film, 
classical music, theatre etc.) had their own industry, professional and union bodies, 
often able to lobby governments directly. This was not so with the dispersed and 
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diverse individuals and SMEs who made up the emergent creative industries 
‘constituency’. As far as this constituency did exist for national and local cultural 
policy agencies it did so as part of the ‘art form’ structure of the UK Arts Council and 
its regional offices. Specific art form bodies were set up to represent and channel 
funding for visual arts, theatre, film, music, literature, craft, design etc. The DCMS’ 
‘mapping document’ (1998) did add other sub-sectors (e.g. leisure software design’) 
to the list of creative industries – but the problem was more than a simple extension of 
sub-sector agencies but one of the legitimacy and purpose of ‘representation’. The 
‘music officer’ of the Regional Arts Board could not really speak for the local popular 
music scene, given the overwhelming focus on subsidies for ‘classical’ music and its 
explicit disavowal of any involvement in commercial music activities. Computer 
games, on the other hand, represented a completely new field in which Arts Boards 
would have little or no expertise – nor would want to acquire this. 
 
Questions around commerciality and technical competences were part of a wider issue 
of who should lead on creative industries policy – existing cultural agencies (however 
suitably revamped) or local economic development agencies? A related question 
concerned whether creative industries should be seen as a series of sub-sectors to be 
led by specific agencies, or be constructed as a unified sector to be dealt with as a 
whole. Many of those in the creative industries did not, or refused to, see themselves 
as ‘creative industries’; indeed, one task of policy makers had been to create this sense 
of belonging and thus simplify and co-ordinate the policy delivery channels. They 
wanted the sector to ‘speak with one voice’. 
 
How were existing agencies to deal with this new object called the ‘creative 
industries’? As a first step, agencies had to identify appropriate individuals/ 
organizations/ businesses with whom they could work and elaborate new strategic 
directions. This involved finding a representative ‘voice’ from the sector/ sub-sectors 
and identifying or creating an agency that could then work with this ‘voice’ to deliver 
policy initiatives in a convincing way.  
 
There were three problems here. First, existing policy agencies were not clear among 
themselves of exactly what the ‘creative industries’ consisted: statistical and 
definitional questions were the relatively easy end of a complex conceptual issue, still 
not resolved (O’Connor, 2007). Second, as it involved a new policy object, existing 
cultural organizations and economic development agencies had to work with 
‘intermediaries’ who were relatively unknown and untested. Popular music, having no 
local industry representatives, was notorious in this context – where musicians (the 
successful and the less so) were often turned to for complex policy advice (with 
varying degrees of success). Third, because of the strong ‘cultural’ dimension to the 
creative industries, many businesses within this sector considered themselves to be 
something other than ‘industries’ subject to economic development policy; and those 
who had fewer reservations about this aspect often saw their form of creativity to be 
operating in direct opposition to ‘policy’, ‘bureaucracy’ and ‘institutionalisation’. The 
image of ‘Cool Britannia’, mixing politicians and rock stars, was persistently invoked 
precisely as an image of ‘uncool’.  
 
On the other hand, there was a strong feeling amongst many creative businesses, 
certainly in Manchester but reflected in other UK cities, that they were being 
‘misunderstood’ or ignored by the local authority. Creative businesses were usually 
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not reflected in the strategic or promotional literature of economic development 
agencies until the late 90s. Many in the creative industries felt a lack of 
‘representation’; but this was less in terms of business support (about which many 
were skeptical, or oblivious) than of their own contribution to, and stake in, the 
transformation of the city. 
 
Creative Industries and Urban Regeneration in Manchester 
 
Part of the story of cultural/ creative industries in UK cities (and elsewhere) is their 
impact on the urban landscape. As we have noted, it was the impact on the physical 
regeneration of the city that was the most prevalent strand of policy making in the 
1980s and 1990s. This was more than occupying and renovating old buildings; they 
changed the symbolic value of these buildings and the surrounding areas (Zukin, 1981; 
1992; 1995; O’Connor, 2004). They made areas ‘trendy’. By the late 1990s there was 
a wide recognition of the ‘gentrification’ process within which the cultural industries 
were embroiled, as developers became increasingly aware of their value and adept at 
attracting them. The story is in fact more complex than ‘gentrification’, with white 
cubes and expresso bars landing in the middle of deprived communities and cheap 
property. Areas such as Nottingham’s Lace Market; Liverpool’s Duke Street/ Bold 
Street; Clerkenwell in North London; Manchester’s Northern Quarter; as well as 
areas such as Chicago’s Wicker Park (Lloyd, 2006) – all had longer histories of artist 
and cultural business involvement in local social, environmental and political issues. 
If gentrification implies a process of residential substitution of lower by higher 
income socio-economic groups, then this was also about the substitution of cultural 
production by new kinds of up-market residential development and its lifestyle 
consumption accoutrements. The substitution of spaces of production by spaces of 
consumption, identified by Zukin (1995) cuts across creative, as well as older, 
manufacture-based, industries. This is exemplified by the recent adoption by many 
local authorities of Florida’s ‘creative class’ idea and their required cultural 
infrastructure; ‘creative industries’ give way quite rapidly to creative consumption 
(Oakley, 2009). 
 
For example, in the late 1980s Manchester’s Northern Quarter emerged as a cheap, 
atmospheric location for small-scale cultural businesses. The local community body, 
the Northern Quarter Association (NQA), was made up of local residents, 
shopkeepers and an overwhelming number of ‘cultural’ people located in the area. 
They got deeply involved in local community politics and the day-to-day negotiations 
with the city council concerning the management of the area (which also contained 
many ‘problem’ social agencies, such as homeless, drug and alcohol related services). 
Local creative businesses were well aware of, and concerned about the impact of their 
presence on the qualities of place that had attracted them in the first place. There was 
a strong sense of historical recovery, of old buildings, dug out from years of abusive 
‘renovation’, but also of older working class traditions in the area – pet shops, 
weaving, political radicalism, popular department stores etc. Creative businesses had a 
high participation rate in the local association and were generally tolerant of the 
different users of the area (homeless people, alcoholics and needle exchange, cheap 
shops and unruly pubs etc.). The ability of the NQA to articulate the concerns and 
aspirations of local residents and businesses related to the tradition of community 
politics inherited from the 1970s and 80s, the familiarity many cultural businesses had 
with bureaucratic procedures (funding applications, planning permission etc.), and the 
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confidence in challenging official definitions common amongst highly educated 
groups7. Though small-scale development has happened through the 1990s, notably 
through a local company Urban Splash, it was not until 2002/3 that the city mobilised 
developers around a concerted plan for the area. The first step in this process was the 
abolition of the NQA as a ‘redundant’ organisation and its replacement by informal 
consultation. The NQA had a legal constitution and a legal requirement to report 
through minutes and annual meetings; informal, ‘non-bureaucratic consultation was 
invisible and had no reporting requirements. Nor did it ever do so, except through 
glossy newsheets.  
 
We would argue that, certainly up to the end of the 1990s, the cultural/ creative 
industries were not simply agents of gentrification but could be an important driver 
for a progressive re-invention of urbanity (Corijn, 2009). ‘Gentrification’ in UK city 
centres most frequently occurred when large scale development capital, through the 
backing of city council regeneration plans, took control of ‘trendy’ areas and began to 
substitute (relatively) low rent production spaces for higher yield consumption, 
residential or ‘clean’ or ‘premium’ office space. The abolition of the NQA as 
precondition for this process merely illustrated in fairly stark terms what happened in 
many other locales. Nevertheless, we also need to note that the nature of this local 
‘development capital’ was very much inflected by its closer engagement with culture-
led regeneration in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
In Manchester (as elsewhere) it was through involvement and negotiations around 
culture-led urban regeneration that the creative industries became involved in policy 
issues, rather than a concern for economic development per se. Research by 
Manchester Institute for Popular Culture (MIPC) in the mid-late 90s suggested that it 
was with the quality of the urban realm and its wider image or brand that the creative 
industries were most concerned, and which they also saw as their main input into 
policy – if anyone would listen8. Indeed, it was commonly felt in this period that the 
most successful forms of local support were those public events (In The City music 
convention, Mardi Gras, various film, fashion, design and theatre festivals etc.) that 
showcased both the local cultural industries and promoted the wider image of the city 
at the same time. In many respects the official and unofficial cultures of the city 
operated in two distinct spheres (O’Connor and Wynne, 1996; Haslam, 1999). The 
IRA bombing of the city in 1996 saw a major ‘rapprochement’ between the 
established urban elites, increasingly concerned to promote the city (especially 
through two failed but catalytic Olympic bids) and newer voices from the recent 
(‘rave’ or ‘madchester’) music, bar and club scenes in the city.  Not only had the 
increasing occupation of the city centre through creative workspace and nighttime 
usage transformed the symbolic landscape of the city, initially for participating groups; 
many music industry actors and associates moved into small scale property 
                                                 
7 In particular, the history of Manchester’s Hulme area, associated with the punk and post-punk era of 
the city, had seen high levels of oppositional engagement with the political, legal and bureaucratic 
processes of urban regeneration. See Haslam 1999; 2005; Dickinson, 1997. 
8 MIPC was established in 1993 at Manchester Metropolitan University (Redhead, 2004). Justin 
O’Connor was Director 1995-2006, when it was closed. Its work on local urban cultures included a 
conference on the ‘night-time economy’ in 1994; a consultancy on the Northern Quarter for 
Manchester City Council, 1995/6; three UK Economic and Social Research Council Projects (cf. 
Wynne and O’Connor, 1998; O’Connor, 1998; Brown et al, 2000; Banks et al 2000; Banks, 2007) and 
a large scale study Cultural Production in Manchester, which provided the research basis for CIDS. 
This document became publicly unavailable after the closure of MIPC. 
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development. Owners of the first gay bar, Mantos and another ‘café-bar’ leader, Atlas; 
the manager of the band Simply Red; a small scale music merchandise entrepreneur, 
Tom Bloxham (of Urban Splash); all moved into property development, some of them 
now operating on a national scale. Equally, many of those involved in this field, most 
notably Tony Wilson, director of Factory Records (and of 24 Hour Party People 
fame), went on to occupy major policy positions within the city. A key moment in this 
shift from the margins to the centre within Manchester’s elite growth coalition was the 
formation, by some of the above, of a pressure group to reject the official city 
marketing slogan as ‘outdated’ and inappropriate for a city of Manchester’s cultural 
aspirations (Ward, 2000). A new post-rave urban growth coalition emerged which 
valorized entrepreneurialism, culture and the creative industries as key to the future of 
the city; this at the same time as New Labour were making similar claims at national 
level  (Peck and Ward, 2002; Ward 2000; Hetherington 2007; O’Connor 2007b).  
 
We would argue that rather than simply ‘sector development’, in the UK creative 
industry policy has mostly been a kind of urban policy – something implied by the 
‘creative city’ theses of Landry (2000) and Florida (2005), though under-developed 
(cf. Scott, 2001).  In terms of an emerging urban cultural and ‘creative industries’ 
policy narrative there was certainly a symbiosis between the city council and local 
elites, and the creative sector in terms of image, the latter clearly benefiting from a 
locational ‘brand’. This is even more marked amongst those with property interests in 
the city. This symbiosis resulted less in calls for specific economic development 
support to creative businesses, more a ‘recognition’ of their contribution to this local 
identity and image. ‘Recognition’ here might be understood not just as 
acknowledgement of their contribution to the ‘brand’ but also of their legitimate input 
into policy development through a range of formal and informal forums and spaces.9 
 
At the same time, this symbiosis relates to the fact that these businesses are deeply 
embedded in, and committed to, local social, cultural and urban contexts. It forms the 
contexts for their practice as individuals, businesses and as networkers (O’Connor, 
1998; Drake, 2003; Shorthose, 2004; Banks, 2007). This was a much more ambiguous 
relationship as it could cut across the interest in development gain through property 
prices that drove the new city centre growth coalition. Thus the concerns of many in 
the creative industries could be swept aside by more powerful local developers now 
able to deploy the language of creative industries much more effectively than 
previously. In the Northern Quarter example, whereas in the 1990s the NQA could 
use the new language of culture-led regeneration in the face of old style planning 
regimes, in 2002/3 they were positioned as local, vested interests opposed to the 
requirements of a city-wide creative industries strategy. 
 
As we saw above, who might claim to speak for, to represent, the creative industries, 
was a key issue in this new policy field; and part of this claim was also about the 
power to construct a new narrative for the city. In mid-late 1990s Manchester the 
consensus around the creative agenda hid many ambiguities. The activities of CIDS, 
consequently, tended to be as much about mobilizing this wider identification with 
and commitment to the city as it was about business services or marketing strategies. 
It thus inherited those ambiguities. 
                                                 
9 We might say it echoes the way contemporary games companies involve users in brand development, 
and are required to acknowledge this through respecting the rules of engagement of this user-input 
(Banks, J. and Humphreys, 2008) 
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The Creative Industries Development Service 
 
Commissioned research in 1997-910 in Manchester suggested that some sort of agency 
be established to act as intermediary between the city’s economic and business 
development infrastructure and the creative industries sector. In response CIDS was 
established11, envisaged as having four main functions. First, to develop, commission 
and deliver bespoke businesses services to the sector – based on the recognition that 
the delivery and content of these services required a specific expertise and a 
reputation (or ‘track record’) not available to mainstream organizations. Second, to 
provide information and strategic intelligence about the sector to the city; and to 
provide relevant information (services, grants, other opportunities) to the sector itself. 
Third, to build partnership and ensure coherent delivery from the many agencies that 
were somehow involved in supporting the creative sector. Finally, the most difficult 
function involved a representative role - helping the sector to identify and articulate its 
particular requirements and giving voice to these concerns needs within the wider 
policy forums in the city.  
 
Issues of voice and representation concern positions of power and legitimacy within 
the economic and urban policy field. The entry of the creative industries introduced 
much uncertainty into this field, for the reasons indicated above. If CIDS claimed a 
representative function it did so not in a formal institutional or electoral sense, rather 
by claiming both to speak the language of the creative sector and to be able to 
translate this into the more formal language of economic development policy. Its 
intermediary function was thus established not simply by statistical or analytical 
knowledge but by the insider knowledge and relations of trust implied by this 
‘speaking its language’. ‘Language’ here refers not only to very different ways of 
understanding and doing creative business; it also refers to the wider context of these 
creative businesses involved in a matrix of economic, social, cultural and ethical 
imperatives. Part of intermediation was therefore ‘translation’, and it hid a certain 
ambition: that CIDS would present the wider social and cultural (including urbanistic) 
concerns of the sector within the formal language of economic development in order 
to open the field of economic development to a recognition of the legitimacy of these 
wider social and cultural questions. It was here that the question of ‘cultural’ or 
‘economic’ policy was so crucial. CIDS claimed a legitimacy denied the publicly 
funded cultural agencies in that it was ostensibly concerned with questions of 
commerce and economics. Only in this way could it sit down at the economic 
development policy table. At the same time it tried to introduce a wider socio-cultural 
agenda into this field – and attempt explicit in related notions of the ‘creative city’ for 
example. It was a strategy that seemed feasible in a situation where economics and 
culture seemed much more open to each other. But it was a also strategy beset by the 
danger, not just of losing the trust of both sector and policy agents (‘falling between 
two stools’), but also by the latter discovering alternative languages for the creative 
sector, more directly amenable to mainstream economic development. Both of these 
occurred, as we shall see. 
                                                 
10 See note 8  
11 Funded mainly via European Structural Fund money through Manchester City Council, then via 
funds from the North West Regional Development Agency. 
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From the beginning, charged with the energy of the new creative industry agenda, 
CIDS tried to develop ways of thinking and acting differently from the mainstream 
public policy field. The first director was very clear that it was not about mechanically 
putting resources together but thinking critically about local creative industries and 
what they want. CIDS became somewhat unconventional, not trying to impose 
something from top down but rather to be responsive, working as an interface 
between the creative sector and the local development infrastructure12.  
 
It attempted to operate through the identification and promotion of networks within 
the sector, seeking ‘representative’ voices. Such informal identifications were a matter 
of judgment based on track record, reputation and the ability to express their needs 
and concerns in a way that spoke for the (sub)sector as a whole rather than their 
particular business. In this CIDS was operating very much like creative businesses 
themselves, working through networks of reputation and trust. They then funded these 
individuals, or sometimes already existing networks, to develop a more inclusive 
network organisation that could give voice to the needs of the sector and with whom 
CIDS could then work deliver policy initiatives in a convincing way. These included 
Red Eye (photographers), PANDA (performance), Manchester Fashion Network, 
Manchester Music Network, M62 (computer games) amongst others. CIDS itself 
worked within a Manchester-based network of organisations, and across the North 
West with other similar creative industries agencies, most notably ACME in 
Liverpool and the Arts Council funded audio-visual agency, North-West Vision 
(NWV).  
 
Against initial expectations it was not through its specialized services (which it tended 
increasingly to sub-contract and sign post rather than deliver) but through its day-to-
day networking activities that it developed its range of contacts and a certain degree 
of trust; a reputation based not (primarily) on the formal knowledge provided by 
consultation reports but on contacts and interpersonal relationships. CIDS managed to 
build up a certain credibility as advocate for the sector, one that spoke its language; it 
tried to ensure its intermediary role by embedding itself in the local cultural and social 
‘scene’. CIDS was located in a prominent (bright pink) creative industries building 
located in the heart of the Northern Quarter. Its staff were recruited mostly from 
outside business support personnel and tended to be close to (if not participants in) 
creative production. CIDS was therefore both ‘physically’ and ‘socially’ part of the 
creative cluster.  
 
But this ‘lock-in’ (or ‘going native’) was also the source of tension on a day-to-day 
basis. CIDS was always hampered by its short term funding structure (and it is not 
alone in this), whereby it could never fully guarantee the continuation of its different 
services. This uncertainty could undermine trust. Equally, whilst talking the language 
of the sector CIDS also had responsibilities for monitoring and evaluation - basic and 
often clumsy metrics (‘box-ticking’) about business activities and impacts which 
caused great friction between it and creative business. It was a bureaucratic process 
but it also undermined the claim of CIDS to be speaking a responsive language. If 
                                                 
12 This section on CIDS is based on interviews conducted by the authors. O’Connor was Co-chair of 
CIDS between 2000-2006. Xin Gu conducted extensive interviews as part of her PhD thesis: “Social 
Networks in Cultural Industries: Fashion, New Media and Network Development Policy in 
Manchester”, Manchester Metropolitan University, 2008 
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CIDS acknowledged that the development of creative industry networks is a process 
mixing cultural, social and economic functions in ways difficult to separate, they also 
knew that public intervention brings with it a different language, one that demanded a 
set of clear, usually economic, outcomes. Despite the attempts to reduce it to a 
(usually painful) lip-service, monitoring and evaluation inevitably brought a gradual 
institutionalization and an accommodation with the overarching language of the 
existing policy world (‘economic growth’, ‘social inclusion’ and so on).  
 
Equally, the expectations raised by the organisation within the sector were almost 
always too high for the level of resources commanded by CIDS, leading to frequent 
disenchantment. The establishment of trust by CIDS staff with the local businesses 
was often based on an expressed ‘commitment’ to the creative industries sector which, 
despite its personal sincerity, could not always be delivered by an organisation 
constantly at the mercy of policy shifts and new funding regimes. Indeed, speaking 
the dual languages of creative sector and public policy caused much disorientation 
within CIDS staff. Personal commitment and sharing a ‘language’ with the creative 
industries in the end could hardly make up for the lack of resources. 
 
These tensions were felt within the networks supported by CIDS. These networks, 
many of which had been purely informal, had to be formalised to some degree in 
order to allow CIDS to fund them, and so as to develop a more systematic analysis of 
their needs (member surveys, for example) for policy purposes. This often 
undermined the more organic aspects of these networks. Many felt that these more 
targeted formal social network initiatives, as compared to practitioner-led social 
networks, focus less on personal issues and more on instrumental functions such as 
funding or organizing trade events. There were real worries about ‘being 
institutionalized’ and anxieties as to extent to which such formalization of 
communication is useful in forging meaningful interaction among creative businesses. 
And despite the ambition to be part of the sector there was always an inevitable gap 
between (relatively secure) publicly funded agency and precarious business. In this 
context it was very easy for the relationship to move from one of trust to one of 
exploitation and cynicism.  
 
Creative Industries as Urban Policy 
 
Though there are certain structural tensions between CIDS’ necessarily more formal 
network initiatives and the informal or ‘organic’ business initiated networks, there 
seemed real value in the development of networking infrastructures in local creative 
industries as part of the functioning of an intermediary organization. These reasons do 
not just concern the efficiency and customized nature of the business support that they 
facilitated. Creative industry clusters and networks have social and cultural as well as 
economic dimensions; they are embedded in the fabric of the city. The manner of this 
embedding does not simply mean the economic gains of ‘untraded interdependencies’, 
skills pools and business networking but is also about a reflective engagement with 
the cultural and social and environmental context of these localities. As such CIDS’ 
remit inevitably extended beyond business support to policy debates across a wide 
front – from city marketing to business support, to skills development and knowledge 
transfer; from protecting ‘independent business’ in the city to reporting on 
development tensions in the Northern Quarter; from commenting on DCMS policy 
documents to co-coordinating responses to anxieties about the BBC’s planned re-
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location to Mediacity. As such CIDS attempted to move beyond sector specific 
business support to a more general policy agenda intended to reflect the creative 
industries’ identification with and support for the brand of the city – something the 
city mostly welcomed – and their engagement with the social, cultural and urban 
contexts of their day-to-day activities – something that was much more contentious. 
 
As we have noted above, the creative industries agenda has been set in a local 
economic development context, but one predicated on wider notions of culture and 
creativity. The diverse group of businesses and freelancers, public and private agents 
covered in the term ‘creative industries’ very much bought into this. The creative 
industries certainly shared a narrative of ‘urban regeneration’ in Manchester, one that 
was particularly inflected by the distinct Manchester brand of popular music and 
culture (O’Connor, 2004). This was a relationship formally cemented by the 
appointment of Peter Saville, of Factory Record fame13, as ‘creative director’ for the 
city (O’Connor, 2007b). But this shared narrative was subject of on-going negotiation 
and could easily be abused – as is the well-established model where property 
developers emerge as the real winners in ‘culture-led regeneration’. What CIDS 
attempted to do was try to create a ‘shared narrative’ between a public agency and the 
creative industries. Only in this way, it was felt, could long term trust be built and the 
intermediary function of channeling ‘constituency needs’ into public policy be 
performed. We have seen some clear limits to this, in terms of what more formal 
public policy language and process might allow, and what difficulties it imposes on 
such trust building. If the dual-facing intermediary function placed strains on CIDS 
claim to speak the language of the sector, it did so also within the policy field. Though 
its brand value as a trusted agency was recognized14, its unorthodox approach and 
(relatively) disruptive language positioned it as somewhat of a maverick organization.  
 
Therefore a more telling limit was reached as the language of economic development, 
increasingly prevalent within the creative industries discourse, allowed a displacement 
of these wider socio-cultural and urbanistic concerns. In a manner parallel to the 
trajectory of the NQA, as the field of creative industries policy became more 
established and its language better known, the specific value of CIDS as intermediary 
could more easily be marginalized. That the discourse of ‘creative industries’ 
introduced an increasingly economic rationale into debates around culture-led 
regeneration and the creative city, as well as within cultural policy as a whole, is little 
disputed as such – merely the legitimacy of such a shift (cf. Cunningham, 2004; 2008; 
Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005; Banks and O’Connor, 2009). Summarising a more 
complex argument, we suggest that though the notion of creative industries does not 
have to be interpreted in this way (and see Cunningham, 2009, for a global survey), in 
the UK context as least, it has allowed a de-complexification of policy, dropping those 
considerations external to purely economic outputs (see O’Connor, 2009). However, 
these economic outputs are now much more easily couched in the language of 
‘creativity’, and hence linked to the culture-led narrative of the city. 
 
This process can be seen in the developments around Mediacity in Salford Quays. The 
announcement of a relocation of BBC production facilities from London to 
                                                 
13 Saville created the distinctive image of Factory Records and its club, The Hacienda. See Haslam, 
1999) 
14 For example, CIDS became a ‘must-see’ organization whenever cultural and creative industries 
delegations came to visit the city. 
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Manchester raised the profile of the creative industries sector overnight. Not only was 
this a prestigious image coup for the city, underlining the success of its rebranding, it 
would also represent new jobs and a substantial property investment. That it 
eventually located in Salford, a separate adjacent local authority, is not something we 
can discuss here. However, the raised profile of, and stakes involved in, leading the 
creative sector meant that CIDS was marginalized within a short period of time. That 
it made some fatal mistakes in the game of political maneuvers is a commonly held 
view, as we discovered in recent interviews. But that the game suddenly involved 
more powerful and adept players is not in dispute either. The North West Regional 
Development Agency (NWDA) strongly supported the relocation and used it as the 
centre-piece of its Digital and Creative Industries Sector Development Plan (NWDA 
2008)– which was to inform all its funding for creative industries development in the 
near future. Key to the strategy was Mediacity as the attractor for major foreign direct 
investment and the creation of Europe’s ‘second largest media and digital cluster’ 
(after London).  
 
Whereas in the relatively open situation of the late 1990s local and regional bodies 
were willing to see CIDS as a legitimate voice for an unknown and ill-defined sector, 
the kudos of creative sector leadership was such that it could not be left to a maverick 
agency such as CIDS. Or rather, it responded to the shift in language, from a cultural 
to an economic policy emphasis, too late. Echoing the DCMS’ inflation of statistics 
by the inclusion of software development (Garnham, 2005), the NWDA plan has the 
13 original DCMS sectors and also ICT – which includes a huge number of 
companies involved in cable and tele-communications. It is little wonder that, 
according to NWDA, only 30 companies in the North West sector employ more than 
250 people and these are ‘mostly digital’ (i.e. ICT). Equally, the inclusive ‘creative 
industries’ has been decomposed into ‘media’, ‘digital’ and ‘the rest’, with the first 
pair being seen as the key economic drivers. The language of the plan gives no quarter 
to any cultural policy concerns, and no consideration of the urbanistic context of the 
creative industries. In addition, rather than delivering policy through a complex 
network of sub-regional organisations that could respond to local contexts, the head of 
creative industries at NWDA decided – in a field defined by its complex 
constituencies and policy spheres – to ‘simplify’ delivery through one regional 
organization. In this context an agency that had been dedicated to supporting 
television and film across the region, even though it lacked all knowledge of the 
complex on the ground delivery associated with CIDS and other local agencies, was 
well-placed to succeed. North West Vision now leads all creative industry support 
across the region. At this point, the CIDS director ‘threw in the towel’ and the 
organization effectively ceased at the end of 2008. 
 
The consultation process in response to the plan, which was led by CIDS, had been a 
rough ride. The various local authorities objected that all resources were going into 
one central node; the network of local agencies objected to sub-contracting to one, 
inexperienced regional agency (though this was left as ambiguous for some time); 
they also objected to the exclusive focus on ‘digital’ when sectors such as music had 
long been associated with the region. Those in the creative sector objected that this 
strategy ignored the complex urban ecology out of which Manchester’s creative 
industries had emerged in the first place. That is, as with the process of 
‘gentrification’, the revived image of the city would be used to build a high rent media 
park aimed at large scale international business at the expense, it was claimed, of the 
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local creative sector. However, the global financial crisis has since undermined the 
extravagant claims for the attraction of major international media and digital firms – 
especially in a city with no direct flights to the US West Coast or the Far East. Recent 
interviews suggest that, in the downturn, small scale creative companies are thriving; 
with the UK government recently launching a scheme to bring them back into city 
centres to occupy empty property (Guardian, 2009). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have tried to argue that creative industries policy should be 
conceived as a kind of urban policy. Creative industries benefit from and contribute to 
the image of the city, but they are also embedded in its social and cultural life. 
Creative industries tended to actively share narratives of urban regeneration, local 
identity and the ‘creative city’. These were valued more than initiatives around 
training, business support and advice, and so on, of which they were and are skeptical. 
CIDS emerged in this context to enhance support for the sector by giving it a coherent 
channel through which to voice its needs.  It was able to identify and translate this 
voice into formal policy due to a trust built around a shared commitment or 
identification. This shared identification inevitably brought social and cultural 
concerns into the field of local economic policy. CIDS attempted to manage and voice 
these concerns within the relatively open space of the creative industries agenda, 
extending its remit across a wide range of local policy issues.  
 
We could say that CIDS had a hidden cultural political agenda; that it would represent 
the needs of the sector at policy level not just to re-engineer its business services 
accordingly but to represent the social and cultural aspirations of the creative 
industries sector at the wider city level. ‘Support for creative businesses’ then 
becomes not just a matter of bespoke business services, or their delivery in the 
appropriate language and context, but also about recognizing their needs and 
contributions beyond economics; it’s a recognition that often cuts against a wider 
economic logic to include claims to cultural integrity and social justice.  
 
The attempt was not to oppose some ‘economic logic’ but to act on the implications of 
the creative industries agenda as expressed in the terminology of local clusters, 
creative ecology, soft infrastructure, creative field and so on. All these implied an 
expanded economic logic, and one that necessarily involved social and cultural 
considerations. This was the promise of the cultural and creative agenda to many of its 
proponents. But in reality such complex policy vision and the subtle knowledge that 
this might demand was always lacking in local authorities. The splits between 
economic policy, urban planning and cultural policy — perhaps mirrored at UK 
national level between the imperatives of the Treasury as the framework against 
which policy impact must be measured — were too deep to be traversed by this 
agenda. 
 
Thus supporting clusters of creative industries in areas that do not seem to promise 
immediate economic benefits makes little sense to economic development agencies; 
the logic suggests that they pursue global media companies instead. In such 
circumstances the difficult balance between the language of public policy and that of 
industry, and between economic and socio-cultural value, can disappear under the 
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purely economic language of ‘creative economy’, ‘innovation’ and related discourses 
which see the language of ‘culture’ as a remnant of cultural policies past 
(Cunningham, 2004). 
 
CIDS has been caught up in the success of the creative industry argument; as it has 
moved ever more centre stage in local policy making in Manchester (and elsewhere) 
the power to decide on policy and to ‘speak’ on behalf of the sector has shifted further 
and further away. ‘Media’ and ‘Digital’ industries, now economic priorities for the 
Manchester Region, have long been allocated to other agencies. It is these who now 
sit at the policy table speaking for those creative industry sectors that really matter. 
The generic creative industry sector, which CIDS attempted to represent, is now seen 
as more peripheral and the social and cultural concerns with which it arrived in the 
1990s are downplayed as ‘lifestyle’ rather than serious businesses. The recession 
might have changed this. 
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